IN THE MATTER OF THE CANADA LABOUR CODE

 

BOARD OF ARBITRATION

 

Mervin I. Chertkow - Single Arbitrator

 

 

COUNSEL

 

Colin Gibson - for the employer

Peter Barnacle - for the association

 

 

DATE AND PLACE OF HEARINGS

 

October 6th and 7th, 1999 at Vancouver, BC

 

 

DATE OF AWARD

 

November 30th, 1999


AWARD

 

I

 

The grievor is a fully trained and qualified Air Traffic Controller who works out of the Vancouver Area Control Centre. On July 17th, 1999 he was working the position of Coordinator when an operating irregularity occurred at approximately 21:46Z.

 

The incident involved an aircraft departing from Vancouver, Sky West 942, travelling south east through Seattle controlled airspace when, at between 15,000 ft. and 17,000 ft., a hazardous situation occurred with a descending United Airlines Flight 1674 on its approach to the Vancouver Airport. Royal 6153, a flight departing Victoria, BC for Calgary, Alberta, was also peripherally involved in the situation.

 

A synopsis of the incident appears in the Fact Finding Board Report (Exhibit E-24) as follows;

 

SYNOPSIS

 

SKW942 was southeast bound enroute to Salt Lake City via the Bellingham VOR. ROY6153 was northeast bound enroute to Calgary via the Bellingham VOR. UAL 1674 was northwest bound to Vancouver on the ACORD Arrival via the Bellingham VOR. Seattle ARTCC requested a non standard routing for UAL1674 to resolve a sequencing problem involving aircraft landing Vancouver. The Vancouver Terminal Coordinator approved the request. UAL1674 subsequently proceeded inbound to Vancouver on the departure route SKW942 was flying and conflicted with SKW942. Control action was taken to avoid a confliction between ROY6153 and UAL1674.

 

The Fact Finding Board came to the following conclusions;

 

1.         A hazardous situation occurred when UAL1674 and SKW942 were permitted to proceed on reciprocal tracks with no form of separation being applied until the aircraft were in such proximity to each other that urgent corrective action was required by the Vancouver South controller to achieve IFR separation.

 

2.         The cause of this hazardous situation is that the Coordinator, after approving a non standard arrival routing for UAL1674, failed to ensure the Departure South controller and Vancouver South controller were informed of where UAL1674 would enter the Terminal area.

 

3.         A factor contributing to this hazardous situation was the failure of the Data controller to forward a departure message on SKW942 to Seattle ARTCC, who were unaware that SKW942 was approaching their airspace, prior to vectoring UAL1674 towards the planned route of SKW942.

 

As well as the Fact Finding Board, an Administrative Inquiry was convened to investigate the operating irregularity and it came to the following conclusions (Exhibit E-20);

 

Conclusions

 

A hazardous situation was created when the Coordinator Mr. Ian Spencer initiated a deviation from a standard operating procedure. He did so without informing the Vancouver South Controller, Mr. Pat Bolivar or the Vancouver Department Controller, Mr. Jeff Alton in a timely manner. In failing to inform these two controllers, Mr. Spencer violated one of the very basic fundamental rules of Air Traffic Control, which prohibits entry into another controller’s airspace without prior permission (MANOPS 512.1 and 512.2). In this sense a breach of directives took place. As such this would be classified as a loss of separation (MANOPS 532.3).

 

Two aircraft SKW942 and ROY6153 were being routed through an exit gate out of the Vancouver Terminal at the same time as two other aircraft CDN989 and UAL1674 were being routed into the Vancouver Terminal through this same gate. Mr. Spencer was not thorough in carrying out his Coordinator duties. He was not clear in his communication of the problem he had created. Throughout this time he was not aware of SKW942. The problem was resolved at the last minute by the quick action of the Vancouver South Controller, Mr. Pat Bolivar who recognized the problem and took immediate corrective action.

 

The Vancouver Data Controller Mr. Chris Queen did not pass a departure time to the Seattle Controller. He explained how this error happened. The fact that Seattle was not aware of pending traffic through Southgate led them to proceed through there thinking all the required coordination had been done and the area was safe. It is likely that had Seattle been made aware of the SKW942 pending exist that they would have questioned the operation. Mr. Queen’s failure to pass the required data to Seattle is a contributing factor to the hazardous situation, which had been created.

 

As a result of those investigations, Mr. Wayne Heal, Manager, ACC Operations, determined Mr. Spencer was negligent in the performance of his duties when he initiated a deviation from standard operation procedures and failed to coordinate with affected sectors (Exhibit E-22). Mr. Heal also noted that;

 

By failing to do so you created a situation that your fellow Controllers, through much skill avoided a potential loss of separation between three aircraft.

 

He then imposed a three shift suspension on Mr. Spencer.

 

The association filed a grievance on behalf of Mr. Spencer asserting he was disciplined without just cause or alternatively, if there was an employment offence, the penalty of a three shift suspension was excessive and inappropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

 

I also note for the record that the parties agreed at the outset of these proceedings that evidence adduced in the Dooling and Schroeter Arbitration, which preceded the arbitration of Mr. Spencer’s grievance, be accepted here save and except where such evidence is specific only to the previous grievances.

 

II

 

There is an agreement between Vancouver Area Control Centre and Seattle A.R.T.C. Centre with respect to traffic flowing to and from the Seattle controlled airspace and aircraft departing the Vancouver Area Control Centre heading east through Seattle airspace (Exhibit E-2). The Vancouver Area Arrival/Departure Procedures appear in that document as Item D5 as follows;

 

D.5      Vancouver Area Arrival/Departure Procedures:

 

A.        Seattle ARTCC shall position all aircraft landing Vancouver on or south of the YVR R-104 degrees thence via the ACORD Arrival as follows:

 

1.         Prop and Turboprop:  To maintain 10,000 feet to cross EGRET at 10,000 feet

 

2.         Jet and Turbojet:

Runway 08:  To maintain 11,000 feet to cross ACORD at 15,000 feet or below

 

Runway 26:  To maintain 11,000 feet to cross EGRET/BACON at 11,000 feet.  Cross EGRET/BACON at 250 kts. or less.

 

However, if traffic from Seattle airspace destined to the Vancouver Airport builds up to the point where there is a problem managing it, there is a procedure for diverting some of the aircraft in stream off the ACORD path to approach Bellingham VOR from a different direction. That is what happened in this case. It was Mr. Spencer’s responsibility to coordinate those aircraft arriving from Seattle airspace with aircraft departing the Vancouver Airport. The conversations between the Seattle Controller and Mr. Spencer were recorded on audio tapes. It is appropriate to set out the same in full as appears in Exhibit A-4; 

 

2138:34

SEATTLE 12

VANCOUVER ARRIVAL SECTOR 12 HANDOFF

2138:35

COORD

RADAR ABL548 HORIZON 32, ZERO

BRAVO CHARLIE…AND I’VE GOT BAKER A CANADIAN

SOMEBODY

2138:45

SEATTLE 12

CDN989

2138:47

COORD

CDN989 RADAR

2138:47

SEATTLE 12

DO YOU SEE UAL1674 RIGHT OVER AH BRAVO CHARLIE

2138:50

COORD

AH OH YES I DO YEAH

2138:51

SEATTLE 12

OK THANKS OK

2140:43

COORD

SEATTLE 12 COORDINATOR

2140:45

SEATTLE 12

YEAH

2140:47

COORD

WE’LL TAKE CDN989 DIRECT BELLINGHAM VOR

2140:49

SEATTLE 12

OK, WE’LL GIVE IT TO HIM

2140:51

COORD

AND SLOW UAL1674

2140:51

SEATTLE 12

OK, WE’L DO THAT

2142:15

COORD

SEATTLE 12 COORDINATOR

2142:15

SEATTLE 12

GO

2142:16

COORD

QXE32 ON A HEADING OF 315 PLEASE

2142:21

SEATTLE 12

315 I THINK HE MIGHT OF JUST SHIFTED, IF HE DID, YOUR CONTROL

2142:24

COORD

OK

2142:53

SEATTLE 12

COORDINATOR, 12 ONE MORE HANDOFF

2142:55

COORD

RADAR ON CDR2103

2142:59

SEATTLE 12

OK AND UAL1674 WE’RE GONNA TAKE BEHIND CDN989 AND THEN BAC

TO BELLINGHAM IF THAT’S ALRIGHT

2143:02

COORD

UM YEAH A LITTLE VECTOR THERE WILL HELP OUT..

2143:06

SEATTLE 12

YEAH WE’RE GOING TODO IT AND THEN BACK TO

BELLINGHAM, IF THAT ALRIGHT?

2143:07

COORD

YA THAT’S GREAT

2143:07

SEATTLE 12

ALRIGHT

2143:08

COORD

THANKS

2143:12

CORD

5 MILES WILL BE ENOUGH

2143:14

SEATTLE 12

OKIE DOKIE THANKS

2144:32

COORD

VANCOUVER SOUTH COORDINATOR

2144:40

VR SOUTH

SOUTH

2144:40

COORD

AH BELLINGHAM UM 10 TO THE SOUTHWEST IS UAL1674

DO YOU SEE HIS ALTITUDE?

2144:45

VR SOUTH

AH I SEE HIS ALTITUDE

2144:48

COORD

HE’S FIGHTING TO GET DOWN

2144.48

VR SOUTH

OK

2144:49

COORD

YOU CAN TURN NORTH WITH ROY IF YOU NEED DO

2144:51

VR SOUTH

WHAT WAS THAT?

2144:51

COORD

YOU CAN TURN NORTH WITH ROY IF YOU NEED TO

2144:56

VR SOUTH

OK

2144:56

COORD

YOUR CONTROL

2144:58

VR SOUTH

THANKS

2145:07

V4 SOUTH

COORDINATOR SOUTH

2145:10

COORD

YEAH

2145:10

VR SOUTH

GOT SKW COMING RIGHT AT HIM YOU BETTER

STOP HIM AT 17

2145:13

COORD

I’LL STOP HIM AT 17

2145:20

COORD

LEVELING OFF AT 17

2146:20

COORD

LEVEL 17

 

As well the audio tape for the Coordinator, the audio tape for the Controller sitting in the Vancouver Terminal Departure South position (Exhibit A-6) reveals, with respect to SKW942;

 

2135:30

SKW942