IN THE MATTER OF THE CANADA LABOUR CODE
BOARD OF ARBITRATION
Mervin I. Chertkow - Single Arbitrator
COUNSEL
Colin Gibson - for the employer
Peter Barnacle - for the association
DATE AND PLACE OF HEARINGS
October 6th and 7th, 1999 at Vancouver, BC
DATE OF AWARD
November 30th, 1999
AWARD
I
The grievor is a fully trained and qualified Air Traffic Controller who works out of the Vancouver Area Control Centre. On July 17th, 1999 he was working the position of Coordinator when an operating irregularity occurred at approximately 21:46Z.
The incident involved an aircraft departing from Vancouver, Sky West 942, travelling south east through Seattle controlled airspace when, at between 15,000 ft. and 17,000 ft., a hazardous situation occurred with a descending United Airlines Flight 1674 on its approach to the Vancouver Airport. Royal 6153, a flight departing Victoria, BC for Calgary, Alberta, was also peripherally involved in the situation.
A synopsis of the incident appears in the Fact Finding Board Report (Exhibit E-24) as follows;
SYNOPSIS
SKW942 was southeast bound enroute to Salt Lake City via the Bellingham VOR. ROY6153 was northeast bound enroute to Calgary via the Bellingham VOR. UAL 1674 was northwest bound to Vancouver on the ACORD Arrival via the Bellingham VOR. Seattle ARTCC requested a non standard routing for UAL1674 to resolve a sequencing problem involving aircraft landing Vancouver. The Vancouver Terminal Coordinator approved the request. UAL1674 subsequently proceeded inbound to Vancouver on the departure route SKW942 was flying and conflicted with SKW942. Control action was taken to avoid a confliction between ROY6153 and UAL1674.
The Fact Finding Board came to the following conclusions;
1. A hazardous situation occurred when UAL1674 and SKW942 were permitted to proceed on reciprocal tracks with no form of separation being applied until the aircraft were in such proximity to each other that urgent corrective action was required by the Vancouver South controller to achieve IFR separation.
2. The cause of this hazardous situation is that the Coordinator, after approving a non standard arrival routing for UAL1674, failed to ensure the Departure South controller and Vancouver South controller were informed of where UAL1674 would enter the Terminal area.
3. A factor contributing to this hazardous situation was the failure of the Data controller to forward a departure message on SKW942 to Seattle ARTCC, who were unaware that SKW942 was approaching their airspace, prior to vectoring UAL1674 towards the planned route of SKW942.
As well as the Fact Finding Board, an Administrative Inquiry was convened to investigate the operating irregularity and it came to the following conclusions (Exhibit E-20);
Conclusions
A hazardous situation was created when the Coordinator Mr. Ian Spencer initiated a deviation from a standard operating procedure. He did so without informing the Vancouver South Controller, Mr. Pat Bolivar or the Vancouver Department Controller, Mr. Jeff Alton in a timely manner. In failing to inform these two controllers, Mr. Spencer violated one of the very basic fundamental rules of Air Traffic Control, which prohibits entry into another controller’s airspace without prior permission (MANOPS 512.1 and 512.2). In this sense a breach of directives took place. As such this would be classified as a loss of separation (MANOPS 532.3).
Two aircraft SKW942 and ROY6153 were being routed through an exit gate out of the Vancouver Terminal at the same time as two other aircraft CDN989 and UAL1674 were being routed into the Vancouver Terminal through this same gate. Mr. Spencer was not thorough in carrying out his Coordinator duties. He was not clear in his communication of the problem he had created. Throughout this time he was not aware of SKW942. The problem was resolved at the last minute by the quick action of the Vancouver South Controller, Mr. Pat Bolivar who recognized the problem and took immediate corrective action.
The Vancouver Data Controller Mr. Chris Queen did not pass a departure time to the Seattle Controller. He explained how this error happened. The fact that Seattle was not aware of pending traffic through Southgate led them to proceed through there thinking all the required coordination had been done and the area was safe. It is likely that had Seattle been made aware of the SKW942 pending exist that they would have questioned the operation. Mr. Queen’s failure to pass the required data to Seattle is a contributing factor to the hazardous situation, which had been created.
As a result of those investigations, Mr. Wayne Heal, Manager, ACC Operations, determined Mr. Spencer was negligent in the performance of his duties when he initiated a deviation from standard operation procedures and failed to coordinate with affected sectors (Exhibit E-22). Mr. Heal also noted that;
By failing to do so you created a situation that your fellow Controllers, through much skill avoided a potential loss of separation between three aircraft.
He then imposed a three shift suspension on Mr. Spencer.
The association filed a grievance on behalf of Mr. Spencer asserting he was disciplined without just cause or alternatively, if there was an employment offence, the penalty of a three shift suspension was excessive and inappropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
I also note for the record that the parties agreed at the outset of these proceedings that evidence adduced in the Dooling and Schroeter Arbitration, which preceded the arbitration of Mr. Spencer’s grievance, be accepted here save and except where such evidence is specific only to the previous grievances.
There is an agreement between Vancouver Area Control Centre and Seattle A.R.T.C. Centre with respect to traffic flowing to and from the Seattle controlled airspace and aircraft departing the Vancouver Area Control Centre heading east through Seattle airspace (Exhibit E-2). The Vancouver Area Arrival/Departure Procedures appear in that document as Item D5 as follows;
D.5 Vancouver Area Arrival/Departure Procedures:
A. Seattle ARTCC shall position all aircraft landing Vancouver on or south of the YVR R-104 degrees thence via the ACORD Arrival as follows:
1. Prop and Turboprop: To maintain 10,000 feet to cross EGRET at 10,000 feet
2. Jet and Turbojet:
Runway 08: To maintain 11,000 feet to cross ACORD at 15,000 feet or below
Runway 26: To maintain 11,000 feet to cross EGRET/BACON at 11,000 feet. Cross EGRET/BACON at 250 kts. or less.
However, if traffic from Seattle airspace destined to the Vancouver Airport builds up to the point where there is a problem managing it, there is a procedure for diverting some of the aircraft in stream off the ACORD path to approach Bellingham VOR from a different direction. That is what happened in this case. It was Mr. Spencer’s responsibility to coordinate those aircraft arriving from Seattle airspace with aircraft departing the Vancouver Airport. The conversations between the Seattle Controller and Mr. Spencer were recorded on audio tapes. It is appropriate to set out the same in full as appears in Exhibit A-4;
2138:34 |
SEATTLE 12 |
VANCOUVER ARRIVAL SECTOR 12 HANDOFF |
2138:35 |
COORD |
RADAR ABL548 HORIZON 32, ZERO BRAVO CHARLIE…AND I’VE GOT BAKER A CANADIAN SOMEBODY |
2138:45 |
SEATTLE 12 |
CDN989 |
2138:47 |
COORD |
CDN989 RADAR |
2138:47 |
SEATTLE 12 |
DO YOU SEE UAL1674 RIGHT OVER AH BRAVO CHARLIE |
2138:50 |
COORD |
AH OH YES I DO YEAH |
2138:51 |
SEATTLE 12 |
OK THANKS OK |
2140:43 |
COORD |
SEATTLE 12 COORDINATOR |
2140:45 |
SEATTLE 12 |
YEAH |
2140:47 |
COORD |
WE’LL TAKE CDN989 DIRECT BELLINGHAM VOR |
2140:49 |
SEATTLE 12 |
OK, WE’LL GIVE IT TO HIM |
2140:51 |
COORD |
AND SLOW UAL1674 |
2140:51 |
SEATTLE 12 |
OK, WE’L DO THAT |
2142:15 |
COORD |
SEATTLE 12 COORDINATOR |
2142:15 |
SEATTLE 12 |
GO |
2142:16 |
COORD |
QXE32 ON A HEADING OF 315 PLEASE |
2142:21 |
SEATTLE 12 |
315 I THINK HE MIGHT OF JUST SHIFTED, IF HE DID, YOUR CONTROL |
2142:24 |
COORD |
OK |
2142:53 |
SEATTLE 12 |
COORDINATOR, 12 ONE MORE HANDOFF |
2142:55 |
COORD |
RADAR ON CDR2103 |
2142:59 |
SEATTLE 12 |
OK AND UAL1674 WE’RE GONNA TAKE BEHIND CDN989 AND THEN BAC TO BELLINGHAM IF THAT’S ALRIGHT |
2143:02 |
COORD |
UM YEAH A LITTLE VECTOR THERE WILL HELP OUT.. |
2143:06 |
SEATTLE 12 |
YEAH WE’RE GOING TODO IT AND THEN BACK TO BELLINGHAM, IF THAT ALRIGHT? |
2143:07 |
COORD |
YA THAT’S GREAT |
2143:07 |
SEATTLE 12 |
ALRIGHT |
2143:08 |
COORD |
THANKS |
2143:12 |
CORD |
5 MILES WILL BE ENOUGH |
2143:14 |
SEATTLE 12 |
OKIE DOKIE THANKS |
2144:32 |
COORD |
VANCOUVER SOUTH COORDINATOR |
2144:40 |
VR SOUTH |
SOUTH |
2144:40 |
COORD |
AH BELLINGHAM UM 10 TO THE SOUTHWEST IS UAL1674 DO YOU SEE HIS ALTITUDE? |
2144:45 |
VR SOUTH |
AH I SEE HIS ALTITUDE |
2144:48 |
COORD |
HE’S FIGHTING TO GET DOWN |
2144.48 |
VR SOUTH |
OK |
2144:49 |
COORD |
YOU CAN TURN NORTH WITH ROY IF YOU NEED DO |
2144:51 |
VR SOUTH |
WHAT WAS THAT? |
2144:51 |
COORD |
YOU CAN TURN NORTH WITH ROY IF YOU NEED TO |
2144:56 |
VR SOUTH |
OK |
2144:56 |
COORD |
YOUR CONTROL |
2144:58 |
VR SOUTH |
THANKS |
2145:07 |
V4 SOUTH |
COORDINATOR SOUTH |
2145:10 |
COORD |
YEAH |
2145:10 |
VR SOUTH |
GOT SKW COMING RIGHT AT HIM YOU BETTER STOP HIM AT 17 |
2145:13 |
COORD |
I’LL STOP HIM AT 17 |
2145:20 |
COORD |
LEVELING OFF AT 17 |
2146:20 |
COORD |
LEVEL 17 |
As well the audio tape for the Coordinator, the audio tape for the Controller sitting in the Vancouver Terminal Departure South position (Exhibit A-6) reveals, with respect to SKW942;
2135:30 |
SKW942 |
|